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SHIELD LAWS ON TRIAL: STATE COURT





Twenty-five years ago, the legal and journalistic professions were grappling with
the issue of a privilege to protect newsgatherers from the threat of subpoenas. Histori-
cally, journalists have used confidential sources and information to facilitate
newsgathering.' Because of their proximity to news events and information, however,
journalists frequently have been called on for testimony, documents, notes, film and
tape.2
Despite the journalists' failure to win a blanket privilege from the U.S. Supreme
Court or a national protective statute from the U.S. Congress more than two decades
ago, they have not been forgotten. A majority (twenty-nine) of the state legislatures in
this country enacted laws-many of them over the last two decades-to protect jour-
nalists from having to answer every subpoena. The statutes, called shield laws, can
sometimes excuse journalists from the responsibility of testifying or producing materi-
als they may have obtained in confidence.
Have these laws been effective in serving their original purposes of protecting
the newsgathering process and the free flow of information? Have the state courts
interpreting these laws ruled consistently with the legislative desires? Are some cate-
gories of subpoenas more protected than others? This paper will explore these ques-
tions in the context of appellate court opinions of the states that have shield laws. It
wilf analyze the relative strength of the shields by reviewing how they have been inter-
preted by the courts. The researchers hope that the study will shed some light on
whether journalism and the newsgathering function in particular is being well served
by statutory and judicial intervention.
II. BACKGROUND
Branzburg v. Hayes3 is the seminal 1972 case in which the U.S. Supreme Court
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1. Byron St. Dizier, Reporters' Use of Confidential Sources, 1974 and 1984: A Comparative
Study, 6 NEwsPAPER RES. J. 44-50 (1985).
2. AGENTS OF DISCOVERY: A REPORT ON THE INCIDENCE OF SUBPOENAS SERVED ON THE NEws
MEDIA IN 1989, A SURVEY BY THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF Tm PRESS (1991);
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3. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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addressed the journalist's testimonial privilege. That ruling was a consolidation of four
separate cases in which reporters had been subpoenaed to identify their sources of
information or disclose other confidences. Specifically, two of the cases resulted from
stories written by Paul Branzburg, a reporter for the Louisville Courier-Journal. In one
of those cases, Branzburg was asked to identify two young people he observed synthe-
sizing hashish from marijuana.' The second case resulted from a subpoena that re-
quired Branzburg's testimony about the sale and use of drugs after he reported inter-
viewing several dozen drug users.5 In the third subpoena case, Paul Pappas, a reporter
for a Massachusetts television station, was called before a grand jury to tell what he
had seen and heard when he spent several hours at a Black Panthers headquarters.6
The fourth case involved Earl Caldwell, a reporter for The New York Times, who was
called before a grand jury investigating the activities of the Black Panthers in Oakland,
California.7 In a plurality opinion, Justice Byron White wrote that journalists, like
other citizens, must reveal personal knowledge of criminal activities when asked by the
grand jury.8 In so doing, the Court rejected the reporters' argument that the burden
placed on the newsgathering process by compelling them to testify required the Court
to acknowledge a First Amendment privilege for their testimony.9
Justice Lewis Powell, in a concurring opinion, limited the Court's ruling to grand
jury investigations that are conducted "in good faith."1  He noted that law
enforcement's needs for the journalists' testimony may properly be challenged in a
motion to quash the subpoena. Therefore, he suggested that courts make a case by
case determination, with the claim of the journalists' privilege being "judged on its
facts by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obliga-
tions of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct.""
Justice Potter Stewart, writing in dissent, favored a qualified privilege for jour-
nalists faced with subpoenas. Before a journalist can be compelled to testify in a
criminal proceeding, he argued, the prosecution must: (1) show probable cause to
believe the journalist has information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable
violation of law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3) demonstrate a
compelling and overriding interest in the information. 2
Since Branzburg, the Supreme Court has not commented further on the constitu-
tional validity of a privilege protecting journalists' confidential sources.' 3 The ruling
left open the possibility for state courts to construe "their own constitutions so as to
recognize a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute."' 4
The first state privilege statute was enacted by Maryland in 1896."5 By the time
Branzburg found its way to the Supreme Court, another sixteen states had joined
4. Id. at 667.
5. Id. at 669.
6. Id. at 672.
7. Id. at 675.
8. Id. at 690-91.
9. Id. at 692.
10. Id. at 710 (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Id. at 710.
12. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
13. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
14. Id. at 706.
15. See Lightman v. State, 294 A.2d 149, 152 n.2 (1972).
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Maryland in passing a shield law. 6 Today, twenty-nine states have these protective
statutes on the books offering varying degrees and categories of security to journalists
who become the targets of subpoenas. 7 Fifteen of the remaining twenty-one states
without shields have state court protections for journalists. 8
The primary reason for enacting shield laws is rarely stated in the laws them-
selves. However, the fact that all of these provisions are aimed at sparing news
reporters' testimony in whole or in part is clear evidence that such laws were intended
to assist the efforts of the press. In addition, the tools of the journalist's profession
that the legislatures singled out for protection-confidential sources and informa-
tion-strongly indicate the legislature's willingness to protect newsgathering.
A review of the legislative rationales that appear in statutes reveals that the pri-
mary interest of the legislators was protecting journalists from forced disclosure. The
language of the Illinois shield law, for example, says "[n]o court may compel any per-
son to disclose the source of any information obtained by a reporter," except as provid-
ed for in the act.' While the act does not constitute a wholesale ban on ever calling
reporters to testify, it does make clear the legislature's intent to protect reporters from
disclosing their sources.2° A federal appellate court comparing Illinois' statute with
New York's statute on reporter's privilege found that both laws "reflect a paramount
public interest in the maintenance of a vigorous, aggressive and independent press
capable of participating in robust, unfettered debate over controversial matters, an
interest which has always been a principal concern of the First Amendment."'
Similarly, the Minnesota statute declares a privilege for the news media to pro-
tect confidential sources and unpublished information. This is to protect the "public
interest" and the "free flow of information."22 Nebraska's shield law has a compara-
ble protective measure, but it goes on to state that those who gather news "shall not be
inhibited directly or indirectly, by governmental restraint or sanction imposed by gov-
ernmental process, but rather that they shall be encouraged to gather, write, edit or
disseminate news or other information vigorously so that the public may be fully in-
formed."23  Thus, some legislators determined as a policy matter that the gathering
and disseminating of news was more important than the disclosure of confidential
sources and information at least in some circumstances. 4
16. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 689 n.27.
17. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.310 (Michie 1994); ARIz. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 12-2237 (West 1994); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1994); CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070
(Deering 1995); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320 (1994); GA.
CODE ANN. § 24-9-30 (1995); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901 (West 1995); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 34-3-5-1 (Michie 1994); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Michie 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 45.1451 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., CrS. & JUD. PROc. § 9-112 (1994); MINN. STAT. § 595.021
(1994); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-901 (1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144 (1994); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 49.275 (Michie 1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. tit. 2A, ch. 84A, 21a (1993); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-
513 (Michie 1994); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (Consol. 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2
(1993); Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1995); OR.
REV. STAT. § 44.510 (1994); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19, 1-2 (1994);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100 (Law. Co-op 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1994).
18. The fifteen states are Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Mis-
souri, New Hampshire, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin.
19. ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. Ch.735, § 5/8-901 (West 1995).
20. See generally People v. Palacio, 607 N.E.2d 1375 (111. App. Ct. 1993).
21. Baker v. F&F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 782 (2d Cir. 1972).
22. MINN. STAT. § 595.022 (1994).
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-144 (1994).
24. Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v. Hayes,
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Although a few states have shield laws that provide journalists an absolute privi-
lege, most states have a qualified privilege, which sets forth the circumstances and
conditions under which newsgatherers will be allowed to keep sources and information
confidential. Examples of the absolute privilege can be found in Alabama' and
Pennsylvania. 6 Both state statutes essentially protect journalists from being com-
pelled to disclose their sources of information in any proceeding. The qualified privi-
lege, on the other hand, varies from state to state, but most of the statutes require a
First Amendment balancing test to determine whether the privilege applies to a given
situation."
Now that a majority of states have shields in a post-Branzburg journalistic envi-
ronment, the question arises: how are those protections faring in court when they are
asserted by journalists and challenged by others? This study was conducted to deter-
mine the answer to that question and to find out which subpoena categories get more
or less protection as a result of judicial interpretation of the shield laws.
and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARtz. L. REv. 815 (1984).
One study of press privilege conducted a few years after Branzburg found that some shield
laws were not having the desired policy effects. The study found that statutory protection remained
little more than a "paper shield" because various courts had interpreted these laws narrowly to deny
reporters' claims of privilege. Shield laws in at least two states, California and New Mexico, were
attacked in state courts on constitutional grounds. George M. Killenberg, Branzburg Revisited: The
Struggle to Define Newsman's Privilege Goes On, 55 JOURNALISM Q. 456 (1978).
These cases, according to another study, may continue to be the exception rather than the rule.
Qualified shield statutes are more likely to avoid this kind of confrontation because judicial power and
integrity remain unimpaired when conditions are attached to the laws, but absolute privilege shields
raise serious separation of power concerns because they restrict or abridge the court's contempt authori-
ty. Louis A. Day, Shield Laws and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 2 COMM. L. part 4, 15 (1980).
25. ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1994) states:
No person engaged in, connected with or employed on any newspaper, radio broad-
casting station or television station, while engaged in a newsgathering capacity, shall be
compelled to disclose in any legal proceeding or trial, before any court or before a
grand jury of any court, before the presiding officer of any tribunal or his agent or
agents or before any committee of the Legislature or elsewhere the sources of any infor-
mation procured or obtained by him and published in the newspaper, broadcast by any
broadcasting station, or televised by any television station on which he is engaged, con-
nected with or employed.
26. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (1994) states in pertinent part:
No person engaged on, connected with, or employed by any newspaper of general cir-
culation or any press association or any radio or television station, or any magazine of
general circulation, for the purpose of gathering, procuring, compiling, editing or publish-
ing news, shall be required to disclose the source of any information procured or ob-
tained by such person, in any legal proceeding, trial or investigation before any govern-
ment unit.
27. An example of a qualified privilege statute can be found in South Carolina. It provides in
pertinent part that a person involved in newsgathering:
may not be compelled to disclose any information or document or produce any item
obtained or prepared in the gathering or dissemination of news unless the party seeking
to compel the production or testimony establishes by clear and convincing evidence that
this privilege has been knowingly waived or that the testimony or production sought:
(1) is material and relevant to the controversy for which the testimony c, production
is sought;
(2) cannot be reasonably obtained by alternative means; and
(3) is necessary to the proper preparation or presentation of the case of a party seek-
ing the information, document or item.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-11-100(B) (Law Co-op 1993) (emphasis added).
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M. METHODOLOGY
The study commenced with a series of computerized database searches for all of
the state appellate court rulings interpreting shield laws. Only cases decided after the
1972 Branzburg decision through 1993 were retrieved for review and analysis. The
analysis did not include trial court rulings because of the unavailability of a reliable
means for including all of them. State trial court judges seldom write analytical opin-
ions on the disposition of subpoenas, and the results of court rulings at that level often
go unreported.
By contrast, appellate courts have the forums for resolving journalists' challenges
based on shield laws. They typically issue opinions explaining their decisions that
carry greater precedential value as "controlling authority." As such, they are the final
arbiters of the rights and protections of journalists in both shield-law and common-law
privilege states.
The searches yielded 88 cases in the period studied. The appellate court opinions
from those cases were individually reviewed, categorized and quantified. Of the cases
studied, the researchers identified 97 separate claims for analysis. Because some
courts issued rulings that crossed categorical lines, those claims were recorded sepa-
rately to maintain their distinctions. The categories included: testimony about a confi-
dential source; testimony about confidential information; testimony about non-confiden-
tial information or about events the journalist may have witnessed; documents, which
includes notes, film, tape, photographs, letters and other memoranda; multi-item re-
quests for "all" or "any and all" of the above named items; and claims of privilege that
were not specified.' Further, the cases were classified according to whether they
resulted in a favorable or unfavorable outcome for journalists. "Other" claims of the
privilege were neither favorable nor unfavorable but were decided on non-privilege
grounds.
IV. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION
A. Subpoenas Seeking Testimony for Identification of a Confidential Source
Subpoenas seeking testimony for identification of a confidential source get the
strongest protection in states with shield laws. Of the twenty-seven claims discussed
in this category of cases, the media succeeded in quashing subpoenas or overturning
contempt orders in nineteen claims-seventy percent.29  Courts are more likely to
recognize the privilege in states with absolute laws. Thirteen states" have what one
judge described as the "ultimate in news media protection." That is, the press has a
"seemingly unassailable privilege not to disclose the source of any information ob-
tained in the course of employment."3 Generally, these decisions rest on the reason-
ing that the courts have an obligation to carry out the clear objective and intent of the
state legislatures.
In New Jersey, for example, the state legislature twice amended its shield law to
28. See infra Table 1.
29. Id.
30. Those thirteen states are Alabama, Arizona, California, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oregon and Pennsylvania.
31. Jamerson v. Anderson Newspapers, 469 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984).
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"preserve a far-reaching newsperson's privilege in this state."32 The amendments left
no doubt that the legislature intended to provide comprehensive protection of all as-
pects of news gathering and dissemination. The court stated that "[aibsent any coun-
tervailing constitutional right, the newsperson's statutory privilege not to disclose con-
fidential information is absolute. 33
New Jersey's shield law protects a person connected with or employed by the
news media who is gathering, compiling, editing or disseminating news "in any legal
or quasi-legal proceeding or before any investigative body, including, but not limited
to, any court, grand jury, petit jury, administrative agency, the Legislature or legislative
committee, or elsewhere."3" New Jersey's list of protected proceedings is extensive,
but similar to lists compiled in states such as Alabama, Arizona and Maryland.
Meanwhile, states with qualified shield laws may look to whether information is
availbe esewher, balancing the public's need to know against the statutory and First
Amendment rights of the reporter. Tennessee 3 and Illinois' are examples of states
that use a three-part test similar to the one suggested by Justice Stewart's dissent in
Branzburg v. Hayes. These tests require courts to consider the importance of and the
need for the information.
The Illinois Supreme Court said it could not agree with the circuit court that all
other available sources of information had been exhausted in a case where a newspaper
reporter refused to reveal a source.37 The reporter published information from a con-
troversial closed juvenile court proceeding. The court ruled the reporter could not be
compelled to disclose the name of the source who released the transcript of the pro-
ceeding. "We think it clear that the statute requires more than a showing of incon-
venience to the investigator before a reporter can be compelled to disclose his sourc-
es."
38
Courts in states with absolute laws are more likely to quash subpoenas in libel
cases than are courts in states with qualified laws. Courts in Pennsylvania39 and New
Jersey' have upheld the media's right to keep source identification secret, even
though the news organization was a defendant in a libel action. Although a New Jer-
sey libel plaintiff claimed he could not go forward in his suit without discovery of
sources, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the constitutional protection for freedom
of speech outweighed the plaintiff's right to bring a libel action.4' Despite the burden
on some libel plaintiffs, the court said the First Amendment right to gather news and
publish was more important than the right to bring a libel action. '
In a similar case, an Ohio appeals court said the shield privilege is absolute in
civil litigation and upheld the denial of discovery of sources where a funeral home
32. Maressa v. New Jersey Monthly, 445 A.2d 376, 382 (NJ. 1982).
33. Id.
34. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West 1992).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208(c)(2)(A-C) (1994).
36. ILL. CoMip. STAT. ANN. ch.735, § 5/8-906 (Michie 1995).
37. In re Special Grand Jury Investigation of Alleged Violation of the Juvenile Court Act, 472
N.E.2d 450 (111. 1984).
38. Id.
39. Sprague v. Walter, 543 A.2d 1078 (Pa. 1988); Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co.,
504 A.2d 211 (Pa. 1986).
40. Maressa, 445 A.2d 376 (NJ. 1982).
41. Id. at 387.
42. Id.
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director sued a television station for libel.43
In Indiana, a libel plaintiff argued that the court should presume that a defendant
who refuses to reveal sources has no sources so that both sides are even in the discov-
ery process. The Indiana Court of Appeals decided that this presumption, however,
would "emasculate the protection afforded by the shield law," noting the law says that
no inference may be drawn from the invocation of privilege."
Some qualified shield laws specifically exempt use of the law in a libel case.
Minnesota,' Oklahoma,' Oregon,47 Rhode Island' and Tennessee 9 simply do
not allow the press to use the shield law in a libel or slander action where it is the
defendant.
B. Subpoenas Seeking Testimony for Confidential Information
Litigants have been more successful when seeking testimony about confidential
information rather than testimony about confidential sources from journalists. The
study found that the media lost on more than half the claims involving testimony about
confidential information-five out of nine."
In Maryland, a court of appeals stated that the shield law protects confidential
sources, but not confidential information.5 Reporter Loretta Tofani had already pub-
lished names of sources in her article about rape in the county jail, thus the court ruled
she could not claim the news reporters' privilege when a grand jury questioned her
about the incidents.52
In 1978, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered New York Times reporter Myron
Farber to disclose confidential information in a criminal trial.53 The court said the
newsperson's privilege conflicted with a criminal defendant's constitutional right to
compel attendance of witnesses and production of evidence.' Following that deci-
sion, the legislature amended the shield law to give newspersons increased protection
and to establish stringent prerequisites for judicial enforcement of a subpoena.55
New Jersey courts have gone further than any other state court by stating that the
newsperson's privilege even protects the editorial process of newsgathering. As noted
by Supreme Court Justice Pashman in 1982, "[d]iscovery of editorial processes is
especially threatening to newspersons because it inhibits the exchange of ideas that is
crucial to the functioning of a free and vigorous press."
43. House of Wheat v. Wright, slip opinion (Ohio CL App. 1985).
44. Jamerson, 469 N.E.2d at 1250.
45. MINN. STAT. § 595.021 (1994).
46. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2506 (1995).
47. OR. REv. STAT. § 44.510-5.30 (1994).
48. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19, 1-2 (1994) (repealed 1956).
49. TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (1994).
50. See infra Table 1.
51. Tofani v. State, 465 A.2d 413, 418 (Md. CL Spec. App. 1983).
52. Id.
53. In re Farber, 78 NJ. 259 (1978) cert. den. sub nom., New York Times Co. v. New Jersey,
439 U.S. 997 (1978).
54. Id.
55. State v. Boiardo, 416 A.2d 793 (NJ. 1980).
56. Maressa, 445 A.2d at 383.
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C. Subpoenas Seeking Testimony for Non-confidential and Eyewitness
Information
Should reporters or photographers be required to testify about events they ob-
serve? Courts have reached very different conclusions in different states. In fifty-four
percent of the claims (seven out of thirteen) courts ordered news persons to testify
about non-confidential information or about events reporters witnessed. 7
New Jersey, Georgia, Illinois, Ohio and Tennessee appear to offer more protec-
tion than courts in New York and California. In New Jersey, a prosecutor subpoenaed
three photographers who shot aerial photographs of a fire from a helicopter and direct-
ed the press to bring "any and all photographs and negatives."58 When the photogra-
phers claimed the shield law protection, the state argued that the shield law did not
apply because the photographers were eyewitnesses to "an act involving property dam-
age. 59
The New Jersey Shield Act, although broader than most state shields, does not
protect a reporter who is an eyewitness to, or participant in, any act involving physical
violence or property damage. ' " However, the New Jersey Supreme Court chose to
narrowly construe the exception to cover only cases in which the reporter witnessed
human participation in a crime or accident." The court stated:
If reporters sent to cover a fire were to lose their Shield Law protection because
they have witnessed the consequences of an act involving property damage, there
would remain no reasonable grounds on which press photographers would not be
considered eyewitnesses as they arrive on the scene to gather news after a crime or
accident has occurred .... If we were to allow the State to obtain press photo-
graphs in cases such as this one, simply because its own photographs were unsat-
isfactory, there would be little to prevent the State from continually and increasing-
ly calling on press resources in its investigations.62
The court noted that burdens resulting from frequent prosecution subpoenas could
severely interfere with the newsgathering activities of many newspapers.
States that protect the names of confidential sources, but do not protect other
information, are more likely to require testimony of a reporter who observes an event.
In Lightman v. State, a Maryland appellate court upheld the civil contempt of a report-
er who observed illegal drug use in a shop in Ocean City.63 The reporter refused to
describe the shopkeeper or the shop's location to a grand jury, citing the state's shield
law." The appeals court said the reporter did not identify himself as a reporter to the
shopkeeper and thus could not claim the newsperson's privilege. In Maryland, the
newsperson's privilege belongs to a journalist who can protect an informant; however
in Lightman, the reporter, himself, was the source since he observed the illegal activi-
ty. Consequently, the Court of Special Appeals held that the reporter was not protect-
57. See infra Table 1.
58. Woodhaven Lumber and Mill Work. State v. Asbury Park Press, 589 A.2d 135 (NJ. Super.
1991).
59. Id. at 136.
60. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21a(h) (West 1992).
61. Asbury Park Press, 589 A.2d at 143.
62. Id.
63. Lightman v. State, 294 A.2d 149. (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1972).
64. Id.
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ed by the newsperson's privilege.'
Despite the inclusion of the California shield law in that state's constitution,
reporters have no immunity from testifying about events they witnessed. In Delaney v.
Superior Court, a reporter and a photographer for The Los Angeles Times were accom-
panying members of a Long Beach police task force on patrol.' The officers stopped
Sean Patrick Delaney in a shopping mall when they saw a suspicious plastic bag pro-
truding from his pocket. The officers claimed Delaney consented to a search of his
jacket, which turned up a set of brass knuckles. Delaney was charged with possessing
the knuckles. He sought to suppress the weapon by claiming the search was not con-
sensual, and he subpoenaed the two reporters to testify in his behalf.
The California Supreme Court found that Delaney was entitled to the journalists'
testimony for several reasons: the observations of the search and arrest were not made
in confidence or were sensitive; there was no suggestion that the testimony would
impinge on their future newsgathering ability; their testimony would likely determine
the outcome of the case; and most surprising, the criminal defendants "need not always
show the lack of an alternative source for a newsperson's unpublished information."
Reporters who witness an event are likely to be compelled to provide informa-
tion to prosecutors or courts, because they may not be covered by narrow shield laws.
While Maryland and California courts have required testimony, New Jersey has provid-
ed some protection to the media.
D. Subpoenas for Documents, Film, Tape, Photographs and Memoranda
The media prevailed in fifty percent of the claims in the documents catego-
ry--nineteen out of thirty-eight.' When the media lost, courts often said shield laws
did not apply.
In Michigan, an appeals court upheld an order for a newspaper to produce un-
published non-confidential photographs of a fire scene. The court said that the Michi-
gan shield law protects the identities of informants and unpublished information or
communication between a journalist and an informant. It declined to extend the privi-
lege to non-confidential materials in a civil case. 6' In a similar case, Kentucky re-
quired a newsperson to provide copies of notes requested in a libel case against a
newspaper, once the names of confidential informants were removed. 0
Broadcasters were treated differently than print reporters in Michigan because of
the wording in the state shield law. In 1986, in In re Stone, a Michigan appeals court
upheld the contempt citation of a television news reporter for failure to surrender con-
fidential videotapes and notes to a grand jury for investigation of a state trooper's
death.' The court held that a plain reading of the state's shield law indicated the law
was intended to protect the print media, rather than the broadcaster. Following the
Stone ruling, the Michigan state legislature amended the state shield law to include
broadcasters. 2
65. Id. at 157.
66. Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990).
67. Id. at 953.
68. See infra Table 1.
69. Marketos v. American Employers Ins. Co., 185 Mich. App. 179 (Mich. Ct App. 1990).
70. Lexington Herald-Leader v. Beard, 690 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1984).
71. In re Stone, 397 N.W.2d 244, (Mich. Ct. App. 1986).
72. MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 767(5)a (West 1992).
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In deciding when to compel production of notes or video, courts may consider
whether the case is civil or criminal. In Pennsylvania, an appellate court prohibited
plaintiffs in a libel action from compelling a reporter to produce filmed outtakes, notes
and other documentary material.7" A Michigan appellate court said its shield law pro-
tected confidential pricing information requested from a technical writer in a civil
case. 4 However, the Michigan law in question specifically allowed courts to compel
disclosure of confidential information in a criminal case involving a life sentence if the
information sought is essential and other available sources have been exhausted."
In an Indiana civil case, a defendant in an auto accident subpoenaed newspaper
photos of the accident and a trial court ordered their production.76 The Indiana Court
of Appeals reversed and remanded, directing a lower court to determine if the request-
ed photos were clearly material and highly relevant, and if there was a compelling
need for them im a third party case not involving the newspaper." The court said that
[t]he job of the newspaper is to gather as much information as it possibly can with
respect to all facets of activity of interest and importance to readers .... [T]o
make the press in effect, the investigative arm of every civil litigant... inevitably
will constrict the flow of information to the press, and ultimately to us all.7"
However, a subpoena for a photographer's pictures in a criminal case was upheld by a
Delaware court that purported to follow the Branzburg ruling. The court deferred to
the authority of the state attorney to investigate the crime.
New Jersey stands out as one of the few states that protects documents in a
criminal case. For example, in State v. Boiardo,79 the New Jersey Supreme Court
overturned an order in a murder trial requiring a reporter to produce a letter written by
a government witness. The witness, a former accomplice of the defendants, sent two
letters to a reporter thanking her for her honest reporting and expressing dissatisfaction
with his government deal. The court held that the letters were not necessary, given the
"plethora of information substantially similar to that contained in the letters."" ° Con-
sequently, the court held that the defendant had not demonstrated the lack of less intru-
sive sources of similar information."
With the exception of New Jersey, most states require production of documents,
photographs and outtakes in criminal cases. Nevertheless, courts are more likely to
protect the news media from discovery in civil cases.
E. Other Issues
1. Waiver
A waiver usually occurs when the privilege holder voluntarily discloses the infor-
73. Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broad. Co., 504 A.2d 211 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
74. King v. Photo Marketing Assoc. Int'l., 327 N.W.2d 515 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
75. MicH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 767(5)a (West 1992).
76. Id.
77. Steams v. Zulka, 489 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
78. Id. at 151 (quoting Suede Originals v. Aetna Casualty, 8 Media L. Reptr. (BNA) 2565, 2566
(Tex. App. 1982)).
79. Boiardo, 416 A.2d 793.
80. Id. at 796.
81. Id.
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mation or makes some other revelations that effectively eliminates the application or
exercise of the privilege. In a Montana case, the court found a waiver of the statutory
privilege ended protection for a reporter's notes because he took the witness stand and
testified.8 2 A concurring justice found part of the court's decision contrary to the leg-
islative intent of the shield law, which was to encourage a free and dynamic press. He
said that the reporter's notes should not be subjected to disclosure because the notes
were not voluntarily offered or referred to by the reporter." Another waiver of the
privilege occurred in a Nevada case in which the reporter revealed conversations and
memoranda he had access to in connection with Howard Hughes' estate. The court
said the privilege had been waived by voluntary disclosure. 4
By contrast, New Jersey has changed its position on waiver as the legislature has
strengthened its shield law. The state could not compel New Jersey Herald reporter
Evan Schuman to testify about a murder defendant's confession just because the re-
porter published information about the confession. The reporter's privilege was not
waived simply because he published information about the confession. 5 The court
further held that "[o]ther fundamental public policies underlying New Jersey's strong
Shield Law support the conclusion that (reporter) Schuman should not be compelled to
testify . . . .The public perception conveyed by compelling Schuman to testify will
hinder the free flow of information from newspapers to the public."'
2. New Theory: Special Witness Doctrine
After finding that the state shield law did not apply in a difficult case, an appeals
court in Illinois created a special protection privilege for reporters in 1993. The court
concluded that a defense attorney frivolously subpoenaed James Dey, a Champaign
News Gazette coluniist, because the attorney did not like what the writer said about
the defendant, a man convicted of aggravated arson and home invasion. Dey reported
that the prosecutor said in closing arguments that the defendant was "shot once too
few times."8" Although the judge ruled the argument improper and instructed the jury
to disregard it, the prosecutor told Dey he was not sure the comment was wrong. The
prosecutor allegedly told Dey afterward, "This (defendant) is a mean, evil man." 8
The defense subpoenaed Dey, saying it planned to show that the prosecutor
planned the slip and the defendant should get a new trial. But the defendant's attorney
also told the trial court judge he did not like the columnist writing about legal argu-
ments in on-going cases. On appeal, the Illinois appellate court said the trial court
erred in ordering Dey to testify, because the subpoena had both a harassing and dis-
rupting effect on Dey. The appeals court found an implicit threat that if the reporter
speaks or writes something unfavorable about the attorney's client or case, the attorney
will find some ground to force the reporter to testify. 9
The appeals court said the state shield law does not apply in this situation, be-
cause Dey was not required to reveal a source. However, the court held that Dey
82. Sible v. Lee Enter., 729 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Mont. 1986).
83. Id. at 1275-76. (Hunt, J., concurring).
84. Newburn v. Howard Hughes Med. Inst., 594 P.2d 1146 (Nev. 1979).
85. In re Schuman, 552 A.2d. 602 (N.J. 1989).
86. Id. at 609.
87. People v. Palacio, 607 N.E.2d 1375, 1387 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1389.
19971
226 Journal of Legislation [Vol. 23:215
should be protected under a special witness doctrine that protects prosecutors and
judges from subpoenas used to harass them. The special witness doctrine should ex-
tend to reporters. Additionally, the party who subpoenas a reporter should specifically
state the testimony the party expects to elicit and why it is necessary to the case. In
this case, the judge should have just asked Dey if he could stipulate to the accuracy of
his column and not have required his testimony.'
3. Separation of Powers
The news privilege under shield laws also has been challenged on a separation of
power argument, which questions the legislative branch's authority to make judicial
rules.
In Ammerman v. Hubbard Broadcasting, the Supreme Court of New Mexico
invalidated the legislaturc's shield aw because lawmakers had exceeded their power to
enact laws.9' Ammerman involved five consolidated cases in which the plaintiffs
sought recovery for slanderous broadcasts. The plaintiffs requested the station's confi-
dential informants and all information obtained from informants, including documents
and tapes.' The court ruled that the privilege created by the legislature was essen-
tially a rule of evidence, and the legislature lacks the power to prescribe rules of evi-
dence and procedure. The court stated, "[t]his constitutional power is vested exclu-
sively in this court, and statutes purporting to regulate practice and procedure in the
courts cannot be binding .... ."3 Since then, the New Mexico Supreme Court has
added a provision to the state Rules of Court to replace the invalidated shield law.94
In California, the Court of Appeals in Rosato v. Superior Court95 upheld con-
tempt citations against four Fresno Bee reporters who obtained a sealed court transcript
and refused to reveal its source. The court concluded that application of the shield law
"to immunize petitioner from contempt would unconstitutionally interfere with the
power and the duty of the court." Commentator Louis Day noted that absolute
shield laws, such as California's, raise serious separation of powers questions, while
qualified privilege statutes are more likely to avoid this kind of confrontation.'
V. CONCLUSION
The effectiveness of shield laws varies tremendously from state to state, both
because of the difference in shield law language and in how state courts interpret them.
Courts are most likely to protect source names in states that have absolute privilege
statutes. Judges are more likely to protect the names of sources and possibly confiden-
tial information rather than eyewitness and non-confidential information. Courts in
Indiana and New Jersey have extended the privilege by looking to the intentions of the
legislature and the public policy behind shield laws. At the other extreme is New Mex-
ico, where the supreme court voided a shield law, then wrote its own judicial rule. A
California court also has raised concerns about the legislature interfering with the
90. Id. at 1389-90.
91. 551 P.2d 1354 (N.M. 1976).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1359.
94. N.M. STAT. EVIDENCE RULE 11-514. (1991).
95. 51 Cal. App. 3d 190 (1975).
96. Id. at 222.
97. Day, supra note 24, at I.
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power of the judiciary. Courts in some states, such as Maryland, Kentucky and Rhode
Island, have interpreted shield laws narrowly.
Based on an analysis of the claims, courts are slightly more willing to protect
notes, video and other documents from discovery than they are to protect non-confi-
dential information or a reporter who is an eyewitness. Testimony and production of
documents in criminal cases get less protection from the courts, particularly where a
criminal defendant requests information. Judges are less likely to compel production in
civil cases, especially where the news organization is not a defendant.
Finally, it is possible that a strong shield law may result in fewer cases going to
court, because an absolute privilege from the legislature sends a strong message to the
courts. Alabama and Pennsylvania are considered to have strong, absolute laws.
Pennsylvania has only two appellate court cases, both resulting in favorable outcomes
for the journalists; Alabama had no reported cases.
There are many reasons why the disparity in state protections exist. For a simple
explanation, one can look to the absence of a federal shield law. The state courts and
legislatures thus cannot look to federal law for guidance. Although several efforts were
made in Congress to enact a shield law, they were never successful. The result is an
array of state statutes designed to shield the press from unnecessary subpoenas. Some
states crafted shield laws in absolute terms, which provide sufficient protection to
journalists, their work product and the free flow of information (from news source to
the news media). Other states, which have adopted a qualified privilege, limit disclo-
sure from journalists to instances in which the source or information in a proceeding is
relevant, necessary and unavailable through other means. The effect is that the citizens
who live in a state with a weak press privilege would not experience a flow of infor-
mation from news media and sources that is as free as citizens who reside in a state
with a broader privilege.
The Branzburg case, while settling the privilege question for journalists who are
called to testify before grand juries, gave few clues on how privilege would be handled
in other contexts. The lack of a clear standard left a great deal of latitude for state
legislatures to act and courts to interpret. In fact, the number and variety of the con-
texts in which news-related subpoenas arise only serves to further complicate the press
privilege picture. Not only must courts and legislatures contend with a variety of pro-
ceedings in which the privilege arises, but they must assess the value of exempting the
press from the legal duty everyone has to bring forth evidence in a number of different
contexts, including confidential-source identification, other confidential information,
notes, tapes, documents, non-confidential information and testimony of a journalist's
observations.
The remaining question is an interesting one for policy debate: what would be
the effects of encroaching on the rights on either side? The disparities noted between
the states obviously lead to a lack of uniformity in treatment of practicing journalists
in this country regarding the press privilege issue. Journalists who have only weak
protections face the possibility of being used for convenience and becoming agents of
criminal and civil court litigants. On the other hand, absolute privilege statutes, while
giving broad protections to the concerns of a free press and a free flow of information,
take a swipe at the rights of the subpoenaing party. As such, they offer no relief to
persons who are falsely accused or wrongfully sued and have few places to turn for
evidence that would aid their exoneration.
Cases that raise these constitutional conflicts are few. (Only eighty-eight appel-
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late court cases were identified in this study.) Also, as this study has shown, despite
the presence of a state statute, each case must be decided on its own merits. Thus, the
criminal defendant or the civil litigant who fails to get a court to enforce a subpoena
against a journalist would be inflicting no harm on future parties that are similarly sit-
uated. The converse, however, could bring irreparable consequences for journalists.
This is because journalists who feel their confidential sources and work product were
vulnerable to subpoena attack, could turn away from activities that could lead to sub-
poenas.
When the press is deterred in this manner, there is the potential of a lasting
chilling effect on press freedom. Thus, the barriers to a free press are raised in three
areas. First, the press could lose its aggressive stance and halt all attempts at using
confidential sources or information. Second, whistle-blowers and other potential news
sources could be left without any legal protection from discovery. Third, any policies
that breach the journalist's confidential relationship with sources impedes the free flow
of information to the public.
This study has shown that absolute shield laws are not really required for courts
and society to recognize the importance of confidential sources to journalists. The
qualified privilege serves this purpose well by enabling a judicial balance between the
interests of the journalists and the subpoenaing party. The differences in "favorable"
versus "unfavorable" outcomes of subpoena challenges ranged between thirty-three and
fifty percent, a balance that makes it difficult to conclude that those categories (Confi-
dential Information, Non-confidential Information, Eyewitnessed Events, Documents,
Records and Multi-Item "Catchall" Requests) were decidedly in one camp or the other.
Draftsmanship of the state shield laws also can have a role in how the privilege
is used and protected. It may help to have clearly stated in the statute the purposes of
the legislation. Only a few states-Illinois, Minnesota and Nebraska--really give a
strong indication of the policy reasons behind enactment. Surely, judges interpreting
state shield laws may look into the states' legislative histories and seek out transcripts
of debates and hearings from the state houses. However, conventional interpretative
analysis requires jurists to review the plain language and construction of the statute
first before reviewing it on any other basis. If the initial review answers the legal
question before the court, then no further review is necessary. A strongly worded
statement of purpose in the statute would indicate to judges which direction they
should lean when there are close calls and what the relative values are that should be
considered in balancing the competing interests.
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Table 1
CATEGORIES OF STATUTORY-BASED PRIVILEGE
Favorable Unfavorable Other
Category Claims Claims Claims Totals















(based on privilege in
general)
7 1 27
5 1 9 33%
7 0 13 46%
18 1 38 50%
3 2 9 44%
0 0 1 100%
Totals 
40 5 97 54%
Percent
Favorable
40 5 97 54%

